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A Revisit to the Prototype Water System
Eric F. Wood
In M. Fiering's paper, "Mathematical Model of a Prototype
Water System," he describes a system which has the following
properties.
1)' Upstream Reservoir with associated benefits (e.g. power).
2) Downstream Levees with ｢ ｾ ｮ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ ｳ from flood damage
reductions.
3) Independent inflows known on the first day of the
season.
4) One-season model, i.e. yearly.
5) Technical functions between yearly inflow volume and
the instantaneous flood peak downstream.
Fiering was aware that many of the assumptions do not
hold in real cases. Furthermore, there are other extensions
of the described prototype water system that would be useful
to explore--for example, downstream supply by either the
upstream reservoir or by an alternate ground water source.
Another set of questions is centered around the upstream/
downstream division of costs and benefits. The area of the
division of costs and benefits falls under such headings as
'game-theory', 'conflict resolution', 'bargaining-, etc. and
involves often side-payments from one user to another. In
many cases, the role of the analyst is not to find an optimal
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solution to the bargaining procedure but to display various
outcome sets to alternative actions.
In a framework similar to that used by Fiering, this
working paper investigates the outcome sets (upstream and
downstream benefit positions) in the following cases:
1) A one-season model for upstream water-supply and
downstream supply, where the targets may be different:
2) A two-season model for upstream water supply and
､ ｯ ｷ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ･ ｾ ｮ supply, where the targets may be different: and
3) A two-season extension of upstream supply and
flood control downstream.
From these results, further extensions to a real situation,
like the Tisza, will be discusseu in detail and will include
a "where-do-we-go-with-this ll section.
In the one-season model, the season will be represented
by a year. Therefore, the inflow for season i,x., will enter
ｾ
the reservoir of capacity k from which a seasonal release r.
ｾ
is made. Like Fiering's model, the xi's, are in compatible
units.
The reservoir services an upstream demand, and like
Fiering assumed, this could be hydropower. After leaving the
reservoir, the water services some downstream demands which
may be irrigation. In this model, the downstream demands may
also be serviced by pumping from an underground aquifer. It
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will be assumed that the aquifer has a sustained yield of
2 units, and its use will be supplementary to the river source.
Furthermore, as long as the withdrawls from the groundwater
aquifer is less than or equal to 2 units, the quantity of
water is assured with certainty, and the cost of its water
supply as a function of flow does not change.
Like the releases r., the groundwater 'release', g., are
1 1
in seasonal units that are converted from some flow rate.
The vector of inflows into the reservoir x, represents a
random process without serial correlation. The probability
density of any particular flow is presented in Table 1. The
capital cost for reservoir construction, cl(k), is also
presented in Table 1. The capital costs plus the present
value of the OMR costs for the groundwater system is as
given in Table 1.
The economic characteristics, like the physical character-
istics, are similar to those of Fiering's. A standard operat-
ing policy, as shown in Figure I, is used, which is char-
acterized by the reservoir capacity, k, and the target release,
T. It is important to consider the constraints, reservoir
empty and reservoir full, which defines the band of feasible
operating policies. We will return to this later when a
discussion of flood control, in a two-season model, is made.
The benefit functions are three-part linear functions
which characterize a long-term component and two short-term
｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｾ ｮ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ Ｎ In the irrigation model, the target is 3 and
flow x
pix}
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water delivered in excess of 3 does not contribute to increased
benefits since commitments for acreage, etc. for a particular
year have already been made. This is not true for hydro-power
where a market for 'dump' power exists--at a lower price than
for 'firm' power. For the power demand, a target of 2 is
assumed. This target will be accepted as given, and the
institutional or economic situation that established the target
will not be addressed--except to note that in an investment
luodel of water resource systems both the reservoir capacity K
and the targets T are decision variables.
H.esults
Assuming that the upstream target is 2 and the downstream
target is 3, the matrix of the reservoir storages, S, and the
vectors of the steady state storages, P(s), the release P(R)
will be the same as were found in Fiering's paper. There are
six possible pairs of actions that the upstream and downstream
decision makers can participate in--for the upstream decision
maker, to build or not to build the reservoir, and for the
downstream decision maker, to develop groundwater to 0,1, or
2 units. The gross annual benefits from these six action
pairs are given below.
G
= ° G = 1 G = 2
K = 4 DiS 2.733 2.733 2.733
DiS 1. 725 2.988 2.997
K = 0 DiS 0 0 0
DiS I 1.48 2.475 2.87
Note: DIS:: upstream tiser
DIS:: downs tream user
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If the appropriate costs from Table 1 are used, and if an
interest rate of 4% with a 25 yr. is applied then the present
value of each strategy is
I G = 0 G = 0 G = 2
Uls 17.694 17.694 17.694
K = 4 Dis 25.947 1 41. 678 2 31.819 3
u/s
I
0 0 0
K - 0 29.835 6Dis 22.12 4 33.664 5
The six strategies are numbered in the lower right hand corner.
Another scenario that may be offered to the upstremn-
downstrodU decision makers is the following "if the reservoir
operator sets a target of 3, which is not compatible to the
upstream uses, how much will the downstream user pay."
Under such an operating policy, the upstream user may
forego a small arnuunt of benefits while the Jownstream user
may gain substantially. This scenario was dnalyzed ｾ ｮ ､ the
probability matrix of the reservoir storage, S, was, for the
same probability density function of the inflows,
0 1 2 3 4
0 .52 .32 .17 .05 .00
S. 1 .20 .20 .15 .12 .05l.
2 .10 .20 .20 .15 .12
3 .10 .10 .20 .20 .15
4 .08 .18 .28 .48 .68
-8-
The steady state probabilities are:
p{S} = {.14,.12,.14,.15,.45}
The probability vector of the releases was found to be:
P{R} = {.01,.02,.04,.63,.13,.07,.06,.04}
Three additional action pairs, to the six given earlier, arise
from this analysis. The preseqt value of these strategies,
under a 25 year life and 4% discount rate, are as follows:
K = 4
U/s
Dis
G = 0
16.28
40.61 7
G = 1
16.28
39.99 8
G = 2 ｾＮ
16.28
31. 39 9
Bargaining Positions
The nine action pairs,' analyzed above, can now be
plotted as shown in Figure 2. This figure ､ ｩ ｳ ｰ ｬ ｾ ｹ ｳ some very
interesting bargaining positions. Before discussing these in
detail, let's look at the general structure.
The upstream net benefit level can be at one of three
positions, depending upon the upstream strategies of no
reservoir, a reservoir of- capacity 4 and target 2 or a
reservoir of capacity 4 and target 3. For each ｵ ｰ ｾ ｴ ｲ ･ ｡ ｭ
strategy, the downstream benefits can be determined for its
strategies of groundwater development.
It can be seen immediately that the strategy of an
upstream reservoir with a target of 3 (which would only be
-9-
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,
realized through co-operation) is completely dominated by the
strategy of an upstream reservoir and a target of 2.
Thus, the upstream decision maker is faced with the
strategy of not to bUild, or to build to a capacity of 4 with
a target of 2, and the downstream decision Inaker will always
choose to develop groundwater to 1 unit.
If the reservoir is built, then the downstream decision
maker will gain an additional 8.02 units of benefits--without
a change in strategy. Will the downstream user pay a side
payment? There is no clear answer to this but some of the
considerations are:
1) If the benefits to the upstream user (from building)
are quite small, then the downstream may make a side
payment as an inducement. If the upstream benefits
are quite large, then the downstream user may 'gamble'
that the reservoir will be built.
2) A side payment moves the position of strategy set 2,
in Figure 2, towards Ｒ ｾ Ｎ In a certain world the
downstream user may go up to 2', i.e. a side payment
equal to 8.02 units. In a stochastic world, it is
not clear how large a certain side payment would be
indifferent to expected additional benefits of 8.02.
Here utility theory would be helpful in determining
how risk adverse the downstream user is. The down-
stream users adversion to risk determines this trade-
off.
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'I''tlO-Season Model for Water Supply
The model presented in the first section considered each
season to be a year. In many ways this is not reasonable--
especially for the downstream irrigation demand. Conceptually,
the same model can be used to analyze a two-season configuration.
Season one will be the 'wet'season, when the reservoir
can fill up to help service the 'dry'season, season two which
corresponds to the growing season and irrigation demalids for
\'later.
The probability density functions for volumes of water
in each season are given to be
P{Xl } = {.OS,.12,.lS,.20,.20,.lO,.lO,.08}
p{X2} = {.lO,.28,.22,.lS,.12,.08,.04,.Ol}
It will be assumed that flows between seasons are independent.
The economic assumptions of the one season model will be
used, for the most part, ,in the two season analysis. For the
upstream user, the three piece linear benefit function given
in Figure 1 will be valid for both seasons. For the down-
stream user, the three piece linear benefit function used in
the one-seasion model will apply to benefits in season two
'only. No irrigation benefits are obtained in season one {the
non-growing season).
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Analysis
The analytical analysis of the two season model is fairly
straight forward. Given the operating rules for season 1, the
probability matrix of releases, dependent upon the available
water (inflow plus storage from season 2), plgl!AlJ is easily
generated. Given the probability vector of season 1 inflows,
ｐ ｻ ｾ ｬ ｽ Ｇ the matrix of the available water, depending upon the
last season's (season 2) storage, ｰ ｲ ａ ｬ ｬ ｾ Ｒ ｝ is also easily
generated. Matrix multiplication yeilds p[glls2J , the
probability matrix of releases in season 1 given the last
season's storage. Season lIs operating rule can also be used
to generate the probability matrix of season 1 storage con-
ditional upon the available water in season 1, plSlIA{J. Matrix
multiplication with P[Alls2] yields the storage transition
matrix for the reservoir, p[slls2] which gives the probability
that the storage this season (season 1) will be at a particular
level, given that last season (season 2) was at some specified
level.
The exact same approach, using season two's operating
rules and the inflow probabilities, can be used to generate
the probability matrix of· releases in season 2 conditional
upon the storage in season 1, P[R2 Isl ], and the storage tran-
sition matrix for season 2, ｰ ｛ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｳ ｬ ｊ Ｎ
The two storage transition matrices are then used to
generate the storage transition matrix for the current season 2
conditional upon the storage level in the last season 2.
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This leads directly to the steady state probability storage
vector for season 2. Similarly, the two storage transition
matrices can be used to find the steady state probability
storage vector for season 1. With the steady state storage
probabilities, through a vector multiplication with' the
probability of the releases conditional upon the storage, the
probability vector of the releases is obtained directly.
Results
The two season analysis was performed with the reservoir
targets in both season 1 and season 2 set at 2. The probability
matrices, P ｜ｾｬｬ S2]' P [R2 1ｾｬｊＬ P [§.ll §.2"J, and P [.§.2' §.lJ are given
in Table 2.
The vectors of steady state probabilities for the reser-
voir in each season were found to be
P{§.l} = {.03,.05,.lO,.14,.68}
P{§.2} = {.05,.06,.14,.24,.51}
and the probability vectors of the releases were found to be
Ptgl } = {O.,.Ol,.47,.17,.15,.09,.07,.Ol}
P{R2 } = {O.,.Ol,.66,.13,.lO,.06,.03,.Ol}
There exists six action pairs that the upstream and down-
stream decision makers may engage in. The 'gross annual
benefits from these action pairs are as follows:
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Table 2.
S2
0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.12 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.75 0.77 0.72 0.52 0.32
R1
0.08 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20
0.00 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.20
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
P[R1 Is2]
Sl
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.28 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.61 0.85 0.87 0.75 0.60
R2
0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.15
0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
P [R2 1Sl]
S2
0.32 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.00
Sl 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.05
0.10 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.12
0.18 0.28 0.48 0.68 0.83
P[Sl ls21
Sl
0.60 0.38 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.15 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.00
S2 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.10
0.08 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28
0.05 0.13 0.25 0.40 0.62
P [S2 1S11
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G = 0 G = 1 G = 2
Uls 4.92 4.92 4.92
K = 4 Dis 2.97 3.0.96
ills 0 0 0
K = 0 Dis -.24 1. 56 2.70 II
Using the costs of the one season analysis, namely
K4 = 25
GO = 1
G1 = 5
G2 = 15
and a 25 year life discounted at 4%, the present value of the
six action pairs are:
G = 0 G = 1 I G = 2
Uls 51.85 51.85 51.85
K = 4 Dis 14.00 41.39 2 31.861 3
U/s 0 0 0
K = 0 Dis -4.75 4 19.37 5 27.17 6
Three additional scenarios were analyzed by considering
a reservoir target of 2 units for season 1 and a target of 3
units for season 2. It will be remembered that the downstream
user had a target of 3 during season 2. The probability
nlatrices, p[lh IS2]' ｰ ｛ ｾ Ｒ Ｑ Ｎ ﾧ Ｎ ｬ ｊ Ｌ P[Sl l.§.2] and ｰ ｾ Ｒ Ｑ ｾ Ｑ ｝ are given
in Table 3.
The seasonal steady state storage probabilities were found
to be
-16-
Table 3.
52
0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 OvOO
0.12 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.75 0.77 0.72 0.52 0.32
R1 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.200.00 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.20
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
P[Rl I5 2]
51
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.28 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.22 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.00
R2
0.40 0.61 0.85 0.87 0.75
0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
P[R2 15 1]
52
0.32 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.00
51 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.05
0.10 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.12
0.18 0.28 0.48 0.68 0.83
P [5 1 152]
51
0.75 0.60 0.38 0.10 0.00
0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.10
52 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28
0.04 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.22
0.01 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.40
P [521 51]
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P{Sl}' = LlO,.10,.13,.lS,.52} ,
P{S2} = {.20,.15,.22,.16,.27} ,
and the probability vector of the releases were found to be
P{Rl } = {.01,.03,.60,.14,.10,.06,.04,.02}
P{R2 } = {.01,.04,.06,.73,.08,.05,.02,.01}
This analysis adds three additional action pairs for the
upstream and downstream decision makers. The present value
from these strategies (assuming a 25 year life and a 4% interest
rate) are as shown in Table 3.
K = 4
u/S
DiS
G = 0
49.51
37.89 7
G = 1
49.51
39.05 8
G = 2
49.51
31.39 9
Figure 3 shows the nine strategies. It is of great interest
to note that the optimal strategy for the downstream user is
to develop groundwater to 1 unit regardless of what the up-
stream user does. Clearly this must have implications to the
bargaining aspects. The other bargaining issues are similar
to those discussed earlier for the one season model.
Flood Control in a Two-Season Model
The one-season flood control model of Fiering's can be
expanded into two seasons exactly the same way that the water
supply model was extended.
(-18-
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Like Fiering's model, enough is known about the
hydraulic configuration of the system to assert that a seasonal
release from the reservoir will result in a known flood peak
at the downstream location. Everything will be expressed in
seasonal flows, and it is assumed that the resulting dO'lim-
stream consequences can be evaluated. 'l'he channel capacity,
D, will be expressed in the units of volume per season which
will be consistent with the units of the reservoir releases "
FrOIn our hydrologic knowledge the units of volume per season
can be converted to peak stage or peak discharge. It will be
assumed that the 'capacity' of the channel in the unimproved
system is 4 units. Furthermore, dikes can be built to increase
the channel capacity to 5, 6, or 7 units. The costs for this
improvement are:
D
C(O)
5
5
6
10
7
20
Flood control benefits can be realized by the ､ ｯ ｷ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ･ ｡ ｾ ｭ
user either from the reservoir or from the dikes (or both).
The reservoir provides benefits by reducing the probability
of large flows. Since the capacity of the unimproved channel
was 4 and the maximum release will be 7, then flood damages
will occur with releases of 5, 6, or 7. The probabilities of
ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ ･ releases should decrease with the construction and
reasonable operation of the reservoir.
If dikes are constructed, then flood benefits are derived
from having more water flow down the channel (higher capacity)
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and having less overflow. A channel capacity of 5 will have
1 unit of overflow from a release of 6 units as opposed to
2 units from the unimproved channel. This procedure was also
followed by Fiering.
The construction of the reservoir reduces the probability
of large flows while the construction of dikes reduces the
amount of overflow. The damages for overflow that we will use
are as follows:
Loss (F)
F
2
I
6
2
8
3
The interesting scenario to look at in the two-season
flood control problem is: "how much will the downstream user
pay for a specified amount of flood storage". That is, during
the 'winter'season the reservoir is never filled above some
specified level and when the flood comes, part of the water
will go into storage reducing the release.
Analytical Procedures
To clearly understand the flood storage operation, con-
sider the standard operating policy shown in Figure 4a. The
standard operating policy is characterized by the storage
capacity K and the target release T. There exists two con-
straints, reservoir empty and reservoir full, between which
fall all feasible releases.
The release pattern for season I (the winter season) is
shown in Figure 4b along with the operating rule for season 2.
-21-
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Season l's operation is as if the capacity of the reservoir
was K(l-F), where F is the fraction of the storage that is held
for flood storage.
The analytical procedures are similar to those of the two
season water supply analysis. Given the operating rules for
each season and the probabilities of the inflows for that
season, we can genuate the matrices P[Ril.§.j] and ｰ ｾ ｩ ｬ ﾧ Ｎ ｪ ｝ •
If F is .5 in season 1 and if there are 5 levels for the
storage reservoir and 8 inflow and release levels, then the
qualitative structure of the matrices will be
(t 1 2 3 4
0
1 f 0
S 2 p LsII S2]1 ....
.:I
4 = 0
52
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
RI . +0 p [RII §.2]
6
7
Sl
0 1 2 3 4
G
,
ｾＮ
S2 2 1: 0 = 0 P [52 1SIJ3
4
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Let the seasonal inflows have the following probability
density function:
P{XI } = {.15,.40,.25,.II,.06,.02,.OI,O.}
P{X2} = ｻＮＰＵＬＮｉｏＬＮＱＵＬＮＲＴＬＮＲＲＬＮＱＲＬｾＰＷＬＮＰＵｽ
then from the operating rule the steady state probabilities
for each season can be found and that the probabilities of
the releases for each season.
-24-
Par a ｲｾｳ･ｲｶｯｩｲ of size 4 and F ; 0 (no flood storage)
tl'1e steady ｳ ｴ Ｎ ｵ ｴ ｾ storaye probabilities and the proLaLility
vector of the releases are,
for Season 1
ｐｻｾｬｽ = {.lOl,.095,.193,.297,.314} ,
ｐｻｾｬｽ = {.Ol,.03,.82,.OB,.04,.014,.006,O}
and for Season 2
ｐｻｾＲｽ ; {.054,.073,.120,.15S,.s98}
P{g2} = {.005, .015, .560, .175, .120, .(l70, .040, .OlS}
£';'01: ｾＡ l:0servoir of ｾ ＾ ｩ ｺ ･ 4 illlJ F = .25 (l unit of flood
storage) the steady state storage probabilities and the
vector of releases can be calculated to be
for Season 1
ｐｻｾｬｽ = {.12s,.ll3,.l97,.s65,O.} ,
P Rl = {.Ol,.04,.66,.l6,.07,.035,.Ol,.OOs}
. and for Season 2
P{S2} = {.064,.095,.l41,.l72,.528}
ｐ ｻ ｾ Ｒ ｽ = ｻＮｏｬＬＮＰＲＬＮＶＴＬＮＱＶＬＮＰＹＬＮＰＵＬＮＰＳＬｏｾｽ ,
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cJ.W] fi.nally for () reservoir of sizE' 4 and P = .50 (2 uniU;
of flood sturage) the steady state storage probabilities and
the vector of releases can be calculated to be,
for Season 1
ｐｻｾｬｽ - {.19,.15,.66,O.O,0.0}
P{Rl } - {.02,.06,.46,.23,.13,.06,.03,.Oll
u.nd. for Season 2
ｐｻｾＲｽ = {.112,.134,.177,.2l4,.363}
P{R)} - {.Ol, .03,. 7B, .10, .05, .03,O,O}
Ｍ Ｍ ｾ
Using the probability of the releases in each season,
the benefits to the upstream user and to the downstream
user can be calculated directly. The benefit function
for the downstream user will be the same three-piece
linear function that was used in the water-supply analysis.
This function is presented in Figure 1. The cost of the
reservoir is taken as 40 units for a capacity of 4.
Table 4 gives the upstream power benefits.
The flood control benefits from a particular decision
can be taken to be the reduction in the expected damages.
Table 5 gives the expected annual damages for the four
reservoir strategies with the four like decisions.
-26-
'l'able 4. Upstream Power Benef its.
Expected Annual Gross Eenefits
Flo.." benefits ｉ ｾ - 4 K = 4K = 0 ｾｾ = .25
()
-2 -.03 -.04
1 0 0 ()
2 2 2.76 2.6
3 2.5 .64 .8
4 3.0 .48 .48
5 3.5 .29 .30
G 4.0 .18 .16
7 4.5 .07 .02
PreSEl1lt value of expected
net benefits: 20.57 27.48
(25 years life and 4% discount factor)
K = 4
F = .50
-.oc
o
2.4B
.83
.54
.32
.12
.os
26.85

.(
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The present value of these 16 action sets can be
quickly tabulated. Assuming a 25 year life and a 4%
discount rate, the present values for the action sets were ｾ
calculated and are presented in Table 6. Each action set
has two calculations of the downstream flood benefits. The
first one (top row) has the 'marginal benefits' which
are calculated conditional to the reservoir being built and
operated as indicated. 'I'he bottom row presents the flood
benefits due to the joint decision of reservoir construction,
reservoir operation, and dike construction. Figure 5
presents the 16 action sets showing the expected net
benefits to each group. It is from the points presented here
thut barg2ining takes place.
Some bargaining Issues
1. In the water-supply analysis, the downstream user
had a pure strategy that consisted of developing ground-
water to 1 unit regardless of the decision the upstreaUl
user made. The upstream decision affected the benefits
that the downstream user realized but the downstream user
may not bargain in the hopes that the reservoir would be
built. In the flood control example presented here, the
downstream user's optimal strategy is partially affected
by the upstream decision concerning the construction of the
reservoir (for example if K = 0, then D* = 6; if K = 4
F = 0, then D* = 5) and partially by the operation of the
reservoir (for example if K = 4 F = 0 then D* = 5; if K = 4
Table 6. E'xnected Flood Dc-macres Assuminer a 25 Year
- -".,.
ｐ ｾ ..(\ject ｊ Ｌ ｩ ｦ ｾ R.na 4% Interest Rate
Dike Decision
Reservoir D = 4 C = 5 C = 10 10 = 20decision D = 5 D = 6 D = 7
K = 0 0 5.93 6.56 -1.800 1 5.93 2 6.56 3 -1.88 4
K = 4, F = 0 0 2.34 .47 -8.917.03 5 9.37 6 7.49 7 -1.88 8
K = 4, F = .25 0 .31 -3.13 -12.9711.09 9 11.40 10 7.96 11 -1.88 12
K = 4, F = .50 0 0 -3.44 -13.1311.25 13 11.24 14 7.81 15 -1.88 16
Note: Top row: marginal benefits conditional upon the reservoir decosion
Bottom row: benefit due to both reservoir and dike level decision.
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F = .50 then D* = 4). The overall efficient solution is
D = 5 and K = 4, F = .25, which is obtained from the
construction and operation of the reservoir with some
dike construction. In the flood control example, the
downstream decision maker must bargain with the upstream
decision maker if he is to move to a better position.
2. Where does the bargaining begin? If the downstream
user feels that the reservoir will be built, then maybe at
the operating policy. Then action sets 6 and 10 are the
two bargaining positions. A side payment of 1.06 units
to the upstream user would move 10 to 10'. The downstream
user would be better off than if he were at 6 and the
upstream user should be indifferent between 6 and 10'.
1.06 is the minimum side payment that the downstream user
can pay so that the benefits to the upstream user do not
decrease.
3. We have been talking about certain costs, certain
side payments and uncertain benefits. 'Are the utilities
for these equal--I feel not. This will affect the
evaluation of the action pairs to the extent that
expected utilities instead of expected net benefits will
be calculated.
Some of the bargaining issues will be addressed more
directly in a forthcoming working paper (Ostrom and Wood
[1] ) .
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A Visit to Reality
Leaving the prototype water system, the question
remains about how the procedures relate to 'renl-world'
case studies such as the Tisza River.
The procedure presented here worked towards finding
the probabilities of the releases, P(R), which were used
in finding the expected benefits from a set of strategies.
From the ranking of the strategies, 'efficient' pairs can
be identified and where conflict exists hopefully
bargaining could lead to mutually satisfying positions.
Conceptually this procedure of identifying the outcome
sets is the way to go. The analysis of the prototype
system presented here is a very simple simulation model to
achieve the impacts of various strategies. Such a model
has many deficiencies, some of them are:
1. The technological relationships of the simple model
are inadequate. In the flood control analysis,
the resulting stages from a release depends not
only upon the release but upon the flood levee
construction at all locations upstream to the
location being evaluated. Thus, if these are two
downstream users, the lower downstream user must
decide his strategy by considering the strategy of
the other downstream user and and the upstream user ••
2. Considering the year as one or two seasons does not
adequately represent the hydrologic events. There
-33-
often exists correlation between river discharges
on both an annual level and at an intra-season
(monthly, for example). \'li thin the Markov st.ructure
that this ftwrking paper is cast in I sueh correlations
wuuld explode the matrices to very large levels.
This explosion is especially true if many reservoirs
are considered.
3. 'l'he analysis presented in the paper investigated
various scenarios. The reservoir capacity and the
reservoir target were set prior to the analysis,
therefore we cannot determine whether the com-
bination is on the efficient frontier. This is
true for all simulation modelling.
To overcome this problem, we either simulate
exhaustively all combinations (not a very· feasible
procedure) or an optimization model should be
constructed--the later is obviously the best
procedure. There is a whole host of optimization
models (mostly LP) for water resource systems
but they suffer from their inability to richly
describe the physical system--espccially the
stochastic aspects. What has often been done
(for example, the Argentina Study by MIT) is to
build a deterministic LP model to find efficient
configurations and then to simulate these
configurations to 'redesign' them to better
-34-
account for issues that do not lend themselves
to optimization (stochasticity, for example).
In a subsequent working paper Wood [2] will
address the issues of optimization models for
water resource systems. Spofford [3J has put
forward one proposal to consider the flood
control optimization problem.
Conclusion
For all the difficulties of applying the simple model,
the conceptual nature of the solution should not be lost.
rie mustidentify feasible action sets from which to bargain
from. The working paper by t'lood [4J on the Tisza identifies
the issues which affect the Tisza and which must be modelled.
This f irGt step should Le stiirtcd inuncl1ia ｴ ｬ Ｚ Ｎ ｾ ｬ ｹ Ｎ
Once feasible sets ｡ ｲ ｾ established, bargaining
positions can be identified. Ostrom is putting together
a group of IIASA personnel who are interested in conflict
resolution--initially around the Pulgia-Basilicata ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｬ ｾ ｮ
and then the Tisza. Belyaev is, I understand, also
starting to get into game theory. The bargaining aspects
of these projects interfaces the Hater Project with other
projects very well, and the ｭ ･ ｴ ｨ ｯ ､ ｯ ｬ ｯ ｧ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｾ aspects can be
addressed within a realistic setting.
\"lood, Spofford, and Koryavov are all trying to
establish modelling procedures to find the efficient set
of possible strategies. This involves simulation modelling
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and optimization modelling. The relevant decision
attributes and Ineasures of effectiveness must be identifed.
EO!!lc of these problems, example the optimization modelling,
will utilize the skills of the methodology project.
Keeney and Wood plan to collaborate on applying utility
theory to water resource problems of this nature.
So, the revisit to the prototype water systenl was
useful. It re-affirmed our ideas of where we want to go,
unfortunately the vehicle that got us to the prototype
system cannot get us to the real system. But knowinq
\.;rhere ｾｬ･ want to go is half the battle.
..
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